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A PLEA FOR APPELLATE REVIEW OF SENTENCES
An examination of methods for determining sentence will result in the
startling realization that the protections in most jurisdictions surrounding
the determination of sentence are indeed miniscule. By comparison, the
guilt determination process is controlled by many rules of evidence, by
many tight procedural rules, and by a carefully structured system of appel-
late review designed to avoid even the slightest error.
Yet in the vast majority of criminal convictions in this country-90% in
some jurisdictions; 70% in others-the issue of guilt is not disputed.
What is disputed and . . . what is the only real issue at stake, is the
question of the appropriate punishment.'
One judge has stated
It is then [when the man stands in the dock convicted and awaiting sen-
tence] that the whole intricate network of protections and safeguards
which were his at the trial vanishes and gives way to the widest latitude
of judicial discretion. What happens at this juncture depends largely on
the judge's conscience or, as some have suggested, the state of his diges-
tion. Nine out of ten defendants plead guilty without trial. For them
the punishment is the only issue, and yet we repose in a single judge the
sole responsibility for this vital function. 2
It is interesting to note that this vast breakdown of safeguards exists no-
where else in the free world except the United States.a
Although the call for appellate review of sentencing within the United
States has received more official support within the last 10 years, 4 the ma-
jority of states and the federal courts still leave the sentencing decision
solely in the discretion of the trial court judge. Review, then, is available
only when the sentence is illegal (that is, only when the sentence imposed
is above the statutory maximum).5
Is there a need for general appellate review of criminal sentencing in
all states? This question has generated substantial controversy in recent
I ABA PROJEcT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RE ATING
To APPELLATE REvIEW OF SENTENCING (Tent. Draft, April 1967) at 1 [hereinafter cited as
ABA STANDARDS].
2 Appellate Review of Sentences, A Symposium at the Judicial Conference of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 32 F.R.D. 249, 265 (1962) (remarks of Judge
Sobeloff) [hereinafter cited as Appellate Review of Sentence].
3 ABA STANDARDS at 2; Mueller and Fr6 Le Poole, Appellate Review of Legal but Exces-
sive Sentences: A Comparative Study, 21 VAND. L. REv. 411,419 (1968).
4 ABA STANDARDS; THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMIN-
ISTRATION OF JUsTICE, TASK FORCE REPORTS: THE COURTS (1967) [hereinafter cited as
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION]; COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS PROPOSAL, quoted in ABA
STANDARDS, supra note 1, at 90.
5 Appellate Review of Sentences, supra note 2, at 260 (remarks of Judge Kaufman); Note,
Appellate Review of Primary Sentencing Decisions: A Connecticut Case Study, 69 YALE LJ.
1453 (1960).
NOTES
years. In order to make a decision, one must carefully examine the argu-
ments on both sides of the question.
I. IN SUPPORT OF APPELLATE REVIEW
A. Reduction of Sentence Disparity
Perhaps the most widely advanced argument for appellate review is
that it would reduce the disparity which arises from the imposition of un-
equal sentence for similar offenses without any reasonable basis.' The
Federal Bureau of Prisons Statistical Report for Fiscal Years 1967 and
1968 illustrates the wide disparity among federal districts. For example,
the national average sentence for narcotics violation in 1967 was 68.3
months. The Southern District of Ohio had an average of 180 months
while the Eastern District of Illinois had an average of 12 months.7  In
another area, two embezzlers were convicted in the same courthouse dur-
ing the same week but in different court rooms. There was little ground to
distinguish the cases but one defendant was given 15 years while the other
only 30 days.8
Chief Justice Earl Warren described sentence disparity as "a road block
to the effective administration of justice."' The President's Commission on
Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice has recognized that
[t]he existence of unjustified disparity has been amply demonstrated by
many studies. [citations omitted] It is a pervasive problem in almost
all jurisdictions . ..
Unwarranted sentencing disparity is contrary to the principle of even-
handed administration of criminal law.'0
The existence of this disparity is recognized not only by judges" and various
legislative commissions' 2 but also by the victims of the disparity. In An
Eye for an Eye,'3 the convict authors elucidate the evidence of unjust sen-
0 S. KADIsH AND M. PAULSEN, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 1287 (2nd ed. 1969).
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(1967); Tydings, Ensuring Rational Sentences-The Case for Appellate Review, 53 J. AM. JUD.
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12 COUNCIL OF STATE GOvERNMENTS PROPOSAL, quoted in ABA STANDARDS, supra note
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tence disparity and call for its elimination, partially through review of sen-
tences. The President's Commission has found that prisoners do compare
sentences with the result that ". . . a prisoner who is given cause to believe
that he is the victim of a judge's prejudices often is a hostile inmate, resis-
tant to correctional treatment as well as discipline."'14
The call for reduction of disparity is advanced not only because of a
concept of fair dealing by the judicial system but also because of the effects
a disparate sentence will have on the individual and on society.'5 There
are four basic reasons for imposing a sentence on a "wrong-doer": 1) re-
cidivism, 2) deterrence, 3) retribution and 4) rehabilitation. 6 Only the
prevention of recidivism is served by an excessive or disparate sentence
while the other goals are offended by it. Retribution is based on the con-
cept that the wrong-doer should pay for his crime, not for more than his
crime in some cases and less in others. Deterrence is based on the theory
that punishment will discourage the offender after release and the com-
munity at large from committing criminal conduct similar to that of the
offender. In order to be so discouraged, a possible offender must see that
the punishment is sufficiently severe to outweigh the possible gain from
the crime. It is impossible to calculate the results of a certain offense if
like crimes in similar circumstances are given disparate sentences. Rehabil-
itation is based on the concept of re-educating a person to society which
is much harder to achieve if the convict feels that he was treated unfairly.1
Before leaving the discussion of disparity, one must realize that the
supporters of appellate review as a method to reduce disparity are not call-
ing for a uniform sentence for each offense. Individualization of sen-
tences is designed to take into consideration factors which will better effec-
tuate the goals of sentencing on a particular wrong-doer.' 8  This concept
authorizes the judge to consider not only the crime committed but also the
motive and the convicted man's background when making a decision as to
the proper sentence. This concept will lead to a different sentence for an
equal crime because the defendants are different. Appellate review is de-
signed not to take this individualization out of the sentencing process but
rather to see that equal sentences are given to equal defendants for equal
crimes. By definition, individualization in the sentencing process requires a
judge to consider factors particular to the individual. Considering the
large case load of trial court judges, it is only natural to expect that even
14 PREsiDENT's CoMMISsioN, supra note 4, at 23.
15 Tydings, supra note 7, at 68; Note, Appellate Review of Primary Sentencing Decisions: A
Connecticut Case Study, 69 YALE L.J. 1453, 1459 (1960) (hereinafter Connecticut Study).
16 Halperin, Sentence Review in Maine: Comparisons and Comments, 18 ME. L REV. 133,
134 (1966); Tydings, supra note 7, at 63.




the most conscientious judge might miss a factor important in the determi-
nation of the sentence.
Without appellate review there is little chance, if any, to correct the
damage done by a sentence which failed to take a factor into consideration.
It has been suggested that the parole board could be utilized to correct
disparate sentences but this method has serious drawbacks. First of all, it
would be of little benefit to the offender who received a short but im-
proper sentence as his sentence would be served before the parole board
could act. The offender given a longer sentence may also serve more than
he should before the parole board can hear his case. Even if the convict
has not served more than the proper sentence, he will have spent a sub-
stantial amount of time in prison not knowing whether the excessive sen-
tence will ever be reduced. Thus, the parole boards would be largely in-
effective as corrections of judges' unfairness. Even though reliance on
parole boards might result in fairer treatment to some individuals, it will
not reduce disparity prospectively. Review by appellate courts, on the
other hand, does offer a chance to prospectively reduce disparity by use of
the court system rather than part of the correctional system.
One unfortunate circumstance which contributes to disparity is the lack
of sentencing criteria or guidelines to assist a judge in the determination
of an appropriate sentence. It was noted thirty-five years ago that
[tjhe law gives the judge wide discretion in sentencing, but furnishes no
assistance in exercising that discretion. In performing their ordinary ju-
dicial functions, judges base their actions either on statutes or on prior
judicial decisions and practices. Controversies involving innumerable dif-
ficult legal questions have in the course of centuries been appealed to the
... appellate courts .... These courts have written opinions recorded in
vast legal libraries. But in the difficult and important task of sentencing
offenders, there are almost no precedents or standards to follow. Since
determining what sentence to impose has nearly always been a matter of
judicial discretion, few opinions have been written to explain sentences.,,
The situation today is basically the same. The trial judge has wide and
often unlimited discretion to determine, without legislative or judicial guid-
ance, which goals of sentencing are to be emphasized. Thus the individual
trial judge is left to make instinctive decisions with little or no authority
to affirm his beliefs. Other than a few studies and the judicial conferences
on sentencing offered in several jurisdictions, the trial judge has little way
of knowing whether his decisions are in line with other judges or with the
feelings of the public. This criteria-knowledge void would be filled if ap.
pellate review of sentences were adopted and used properly by appellate
judges. Policy guidelines would develop and unjust sentence disparity
would be eliminated. The Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Im-
provements in Judicial Machinery has concluded that
19 S. WARNER AND H. CABOT, JUDGES AND LAW REFoRm, 159-160 (1936).
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[rjeview would encourage both trial and appellate courts to devote more
attention to the theory and philosophy of sentencing. Appellate opinions
on sentencing would provide a coherent body of case law embodying prin-
ciples of sentencing to be applied at the trial level .... The development
of a coherent body of case law ...would allow trial judges the desired
flexibility to exercise discretion within the bounds of previously decided
principles of sentencing.20
This development requires appellate courts to view their function not only
as a protector against "horrible sentencing examples"2 1 but as policy-prec-
edent making bodies. Implicit in this development is a requirement that
reviewing courts must articulate their reasons for sentence changes. Thus
the appellate court could be used to protect individuals by correcting grossly
excessive sentences and also help to eliminate subsequent disparity through
the development of sentencing principles.
B. Reduction of Technical Appeals and Strained Interpretations
The establishment of appellate review of sentences will be of benefit
to appellate judges by permitting the judge to focus on what is often the
real issue of many appeals-sentence severity. One must recognize that
[t]here is scarcely a court of appeals ...whose calendars are not already
congested with thinly veiled entreaties imploring it to find a loophole in
the law so that a Draconian sentence may be upset. Many appeals are
docketed today only because of the severity of the sentence pronounced in
the district court and since the appellate tribunal cannot tackle the real is-
sue in a forthright manner, it may, and often does, in its endeavor to
strike down a harsh penalty, give the law a strained construction liable
to work havoc in future cases ....
Where a court of appeals is in doubt on the substantive points of a dose
case, there is always the chance that it will allow an outrageous sentence to
tip the balance toward reversal.2
The present system in most states of not allowing a sentence to be ap-
pealed encourages a defendant to appeal on a technical error. He does so
with the hope that the appellate judge will use this slight error as a justifica-
tion for reversal of the excessive sentence. If the judge is moved to reverse
the decision because of the severe or disparate sentence, he often must rely
on fanciful reasons which are precedent. With the adoption of appellate
review of the sentencing decisions, the necessity of relying on fanciful rea-
sons to reverse a severe sentence would be eliminated and less damage would
be done to the substantive law.
C. Elimination of a Fearfully Overbroad Power in One Man
Perhaps there is another benefit of appellate review which, although
2 0 Tydings, supra note 7, at 73.
21 Connecticut Study, supra note 15, at 1477.
2 2 Appellate Review of Sentences, 32 F.R.D. 249, 271 (1962) (remarks of Judge Sobeloff).
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hinted at by most advocates of such a system,23 remains in the background
of the whole sentence review movement. In states without sentence re-
view, one man, through the exercise of his discretionary sentencing power,
holds the future of others in his hands. Since the origins of this country,
Americans have been nursed on the theory that unchecked power in the
hands of one man is undesirable because power often corrupts. The adop-
tion of an appellate review system would remove the seemingly unchecked
power from the hands of one man. It is suggested that this theory and
fear are a very real part of the call for appellate review.
II. IN CRITICISM OF APPELLATE REVIEW
Not all people agree on the relative value of appellate review. There
are those who for varied reasons prefer the sentencing system to remain as
it is in the majority of states today. Arguments against appellate review
can be divided into three categories: those which assert that appellate re-
view is unworkable, those which assert that the goals of appellate review
are not attainable, and those which try to show that the present system is
best left undisturbed or is the best possible.
A. Unworkability
The most common argument advanced against appellate review is that
the appellate courts would be flooded with frivolous appeals. 4 Oppo-
nents argue that the appellate court system is already critically overbur-
dened; that the enactment of a sentence review statute will ". . . open flood-
gates and drown appellate courts in a deluge of frivolous appeals, and that
the costs [in time and money) of either articulation [of reasons for a partic-
ular sentence by a trial court judge] or review would be prohibitive."
This argument, although valid to some extent, is reduced in persuasive-
ness by several factors. One such factor, referred to above, is that many
of the appeals taken today are taken only because of the sentence imposed.
It has been stated that:
... excessive and disproportionate penalties are a primary reason today why
our courts are swamped by criminal appeals. Making the quantum of
punishment an independent basis for appeal is not likely to increase ap-
pellate case loads to an unmanageable extent. It has not had that effect
in Massachusetts or Connecticut where the appeal is to a special panel or
in England where the jurisdiction is vested in the regular court of ap-
peals 20
23 Id. at 262, 263, 273.
24 Frankel, The Sentencing Aforass, and a Suggestion For Reform, 3 CRIM. L. BULL. 365,
379 (1967).
2G Id,
2 A4ppellate Review of Sentences, 32 F.R.D. 249, 272-73 (1962) (remarks of Judge Sobe-
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In addition,
[s]tate jurisdictions permitting appellate review . . have not experienced
an unmanageable burden on the reviewing court .... [Statistics do] not
indicate that there would be a significant increase in caseload .. . . (em-
phasis added) 27
Moreover, even if the adoption of an appellate review system would
result in more appeals taken so as to tax the courts more than at present,
"this objection completely evades the issue of whether an appeals proce-
dure is needed to insure the quality of justice that should characterize our
courts."1
28
B. Unattainability of Goals
Opponents of appellate review argue that the goal of uniformity is not
attainable, or if so, only superficially. 29  It is argued that uniformity is not
attainable because no two defendants are alike 0 and should not be treated
alike. Opponents also argue that a sentencing policy will not result from
the adoption of appellate review. These contenders point to studies3 of
two states with a reviewing system and suggest that appellate review does
not appear to have substantially altered sentencing patterns.
The uniformity objection may be valid if, by uniformity, it is meant
that equal sentences should be given for a given offense without regard
for individuals' differences. But this argument distorts the true goal of
appellate review.
.I. [W]hat is sought is not absolute uniformity but a uniformly fair and
equitable approach. It's quite beyond legislative ingenuity to invent a slot
machine that will dispense automatic justice either at the trial level ... or
anywhere.... but it would seem that the toughness of the problem is no
reason to bar re-examination; rather, it is a ground for favoring it.32
Although the development of guidelines in jurisdictions with appellate
review has not been as successful as hoped, and sentencing patterns may
not have been altered beyond the lowering of grossly excessive sentences,
there is still much hope that these changes will come about. Some writers
have concluded that 'England, which has had appellate review for 50 years,
has had progress in the development of sentencing policies and has altered
its sentencing patterns.3 3  The reason for the difference between the En-
27 Tydings, supra note 7, at 72.
28 ABA STANDARDS, supra note 1, at 5.
2 9 Appellate Review of Sentences, 32 F.R.D. 249, 279 (1962) (remarks of Judge Sobeloff).
3 0 Rubin, Disparity and Equality of Sentences-A Constitutional Challenge, 40 F.R.D. 55
(1966).
31 See Halperin, supra note 9, at 301; Connecticut Study, supra note 15, at 1462.
3 2 Appellate Review of Sentences, 32 F.R.D. 249, 273 (1962) (remarks of Judge Sobeloff).
33MADOR REPORT, quoted in ABA STANDARDs, supra note 1, at 128.
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glish and American systems in development of policies is in the courts'
view of their function."4 English appellate courts realize that the develop-
ment of sentencing policies is part of their function, whereas most Ameri-
can appellate courts empowered to review sentences see themselves only as
protectors against grossly excessive sentences. Perhaps the legislature could
assist appellate courts in recognizing their function, by expounding the
purposes of sentence review within a sentence review statute.
C. Undesirability of Sentence Review
Opponents of appellate review argue that the adoption of such a system
will lead to undesirable results. It is argued that if per chance, some sort
of uniformity develops, justice will be diminished through the sterility of
sentencing. In other words, trial court judges will give a safe "sentence"-
one which the trial court judge feels will not be reversed-even though
he feels that the defendant deserves a longer sentence. The crux of this
argument is that the trial judge will lose all the discretion which permits
him to "individualize." With this discretion effectively taken away by the
threat of reversal, the resulting sentences will be more unjust than the few
disparate sentences which appellate review is alleged to cure.
Opponents to appellate review also argue that appellate court judges
are not qualified to accept the responsibility over sentencing which such a
system would give to them. This objection is based on various distinctions
which arguably exist between appellate and trial court judges. It is ar-
gued that the trier of fact has the advantage of observing the defendant
he is sentencing. Judge Brewster states that
[i]t is better to have one man with the advantage of having observed the
particular defendant and others appearing and giving information, and
with the further advantage of having theretofore observed many other de-
fendants appearing for sentencing, than to have a panel of three judges,
none of whom has ever seen the particular defendant involved during the
sentencing proceedings, and most of whom has never seen any defendant
during any sentencing proceedings.35
This special insight the trier of fact is able to achieve results both from
seeing the individual defendant and from the type of experience a trial
court judge has gained from observing and dealing with a succession of
offenders."'
Over the years a trial court judge deals with a wide variety of defend-
ants and thereby develops some expertise in recognizing factors important
in the sentencing decision. Not only is the appellate court judge unac-
34 ABA STANDARDS, supra note 1; Connecticut Study, supra note 15, at 1462, 1477. Com-
pare L. ORFIELD, CRIMINAL APPEALS IN AMERICA (1939) with S. WARNER AND H. CABOT,
tupra note 19, at 171.
35 Brewster, Appellate Review of Sentences, 40 F.R.D. 79,82 (1965).
30Id. at 80.
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customed to dealing with the defendant's individual characteristics but he
is also unaccustomed to dealing with matters of discretion. It is argued
that the appellate courts have always been concerned with questions of
law and not questions of fact. Thus the appellate court judges would not
be qualified to question the trial judges' discretion. It is felt that the re-
sults of allowing such an intrusion in the discretion by unqualified judges
would be so undesirable as to greatly outweigh any possible advantages
to be achieved by appellate review.
Advocates of an appellate review system argue that the results alleged
by the opponents either will not materialize or are not undesirable. Ad-
vocates urge that the trial judge will not lose his power to individualize.
They state that appellate review is a method of supervising the sentencing
system-it is not to take away the trial judge's discretion. One such advo-
cate states
[d]iscretion in the trial judge there should certainly be but the objective
is to provide a technique whereby discretion shall be allowed ample crea-
tive scope and yet be subject to some degree of discipline.... Naturally
great weight should be given to his [the trial judge's] decision but it
should not be held sacroscanct 37
The distinctions made between the trial court and the appellate court
judges are partially valid but the supposed results associated with these dis-
tinctions are questionable. For example, opponents argue that the advan-
tage of observing the defendant being sentenced and of having seen others
in a like situation gives the trial court judge some special insight. This
argument loses much of its potency when one realizes that up to 90%7o of
defendants plead guilty at criminal trials. The judge's view of the de-
fendant in these cases is very limited and its value questionable. Even a
trial judge who has been sentencing for many years cannot look at a man
and, by a "gut reaction" determine the proper sentence every time. If there
is some truth to the theory that the trial judge gains some special knowl-
edge of the defendant by seeing him for a prolonged period, this aspect
could be taken up by the appellate court and still enable a ".. . dispassionate
tribunal [to] re-examine sentences imposed by a trial judge who might be
improperly swayed in his judgment by prolonged contact with the crimi-
nal defendant during the trial, or in extreme cases by popular emotions
within the community."'8
The argument against appellate review which essentially says that ap-
pellate court judges have not previously dealt with individuals overlooks
the fact that there are a great number of appellate judges who have had
extensive trial experience before their promotion to the appellate bench.
37 Appellate Review of Sentences, 32 E.ILD. 249, 273-74 (1962) (remarks of Judge Sobe-
38 Id. at 262 (remarks of Judge Kaufman).
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The last distinction which is said will result in undesirable consequences
is that appellate courts are accustomed to handling questions of law rather
than discretionary matters involving judgment.
But it is noted that:
[tjhe law books are full of instances in which appellate courts have re-
versed the exercise of discretion by a trial judge. . . . In each of these
instances, appellate courts are quite used to according latitude to the man
on the scene, as it were. But where his judgment is wrong in principle,
they do not hesitate to intervene. No more and no less is needed where
the sentence is involved.39
It seems questionable whether any of the distinctions made between
these two types of judges are at all relevant in a determination of whether
to adopt a sentence reviewing system. These distinctions are important
only if the appellate court would be performing the same functions as the
trial court. Under a sentencing reviewing system the appellate court would
not be performing the same function but would rather be developing policy
and to watching over the trial courts so as to eliminate unjustified dispar-
ity. Of course
[i]t is true that in case of abuse [of the trial court's discretioni the ap-
pellate review would call that discretion into question. But that is as it
should be. Totally unsupervised discretion is anarchy.40
The function of the appellate court would be to prevent this anarchy.
III. POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVES TO SENTENCE REVIEW
Before a determination can be made to adopt a system of appellate re-
view of sentencing there must be some consideration of the suggested al-
ternatives to such a system. Opponents of appellate review have charged
that to the extent uniformity of sentencing is desirable, it (along with the
other objectives) can be achieved through better methods.
One of the suggested alternatives is the development of sentencing
institutes4' which could study and formulate policies. Some institutes
have been held in the federal court system42 but little seems to have been
accomplished toward achieving the goals desired. This method would be
helpful in achieving a sentencing policy if the institutes were held much
more often and on a wider basis. The problem inherent in this method
is that it offers no way to correct any disparity which may come about even
after a policy is developed. In other words, there is no way to enforce this
policy if a judge refuses to abide by it.
Another alt&rnative suggested is the establishment of a sentencing coun-
30 ABA STANDARDs, supra note 1, at 5.
40 Appellate Review of Sentences, 32 F.R.D. 249, 273 (1962) (remarks of Judge Sobeloff).
41 Tydings, supra note 7, at 72.
42 Id. at 70.
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cil.43 This council, to be made up of two or three judges including the
judge trying the case, would make suggestions as to the sentence to be
imposed. The judge who heard the case would still have the final deci-
sion as to the sentence imposed. This alternative could be effective in re-
ducing some excessive sentences but since the judge imposing sentence is
in no way bound by the advice and recommendations of the council, the
possibilities for disparity and inequity still exist.44
California has extended the idea of a sentencing council by permitting
the judge to determine only the type of sentence (fine, probation, county
jail or state prison) to be imposed.45 If the sentence is to the state prison,
the Adult Authority, a non-judicial panel, determines the length of the sen-
tence the offender will serve.46  There are serious disadvantages to this
type of system:
Board sentencing does not grapple with the basic problems of sentenc-
ing.... [It is not an approach to sentencing, it is an approach to only
one part of it-commitments. Scientific sentencing involves the total ju-
dicial function-determining whether to suspend sentence, or use proba-
tion, or fine, or commit.47
As the Adult Authority has the power not only to fix the sentence but
also to refix the sentence, there is an enormous pressure "to punish prison-
ers not solely for their crimes but also for their behavior in prison." 48 The
system could also have an adverse effect on the offender who will never
know exactly how much of the maximum sentence he will serve.
Mention must also be made of sentencing by jury rather than by the
judge.49  This method of sentencing, rather than decreasing disparity and
establishing a sentencing policy, would tend to be worse than giving the
trial judge complete discretion.
To be just to the defendant and at the same time protect the community,
the sentence must be based on a professional analysis and evaluation of the
offender and his crime.50
Most jury members have no experience in such analysis. With juries
changing for every case, the elimination of disparity or the development
of a sentencing policy would be impossible.
Although some of these suggestions may offer advantages, they
are not entirely alternatives; in any system of sentencing there should be
431d. at 71.
441d. at 71.
45 CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 3020-3025 (West 1954).
46 Id.
4 7 S. RUBIN, THE LAW OF CRIMINAL CoRRECIoN, 130 (1963).
481d. at 131.
49Id. at 122.
o Id. at 124.
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some degree of appellate review available to articulate broad policies and
ensure redress in individual instances where the system fails. 51
Weighing the asserted advantages and the feasibility of a system of
appellate review of sentences against the alleged disadvantages of the
system, one seems compelled to advocate the adoption of such a system.
IV. SUGGESTED PROVISIONS TO BE INCLUDED IN AN
APPELLATE REVIEW STATUTE
A. Methods of Adopting an Appellate Review System
Once the determination has been made to adopt appellate review of
sentencing, the methods of adopting such a system must be explored. Thir-
teen states have adopted appellate review through express statutory
grants.5 2 The courts of six states have construed the appellate judge's stat-
utory power "to reverse, affirm, or modify" as including the power to re-
view the merits of a sentence.53 Although it is asserted that any method
of adoption is better than no appellate review of sentences at all, express
statutory adoption is most desirable in that it permits the greatest control
and planning over the development of a system of appellate review. There
are several areas within the procedural aspects of an appellate review sys-
tem which are controversial. For example, should the issue of sentence be
presented to the present appellate court system along with other issues
involved in the case, or should there be sentence review by a specialized
tribunal? Should trial or appellate courts be required to state their reasons
for a particular decision? What limitations should be placed on the avail-
ability of review? These and other questions have been asked concerning
the adoption of an appellate review system.
If the system is adopted through the courts' construction of a general
statute, many of these questions will remain unanswered until ruled upon.
There will be a better opportunity to make a more reasoned and organ-
ized plan permitting appellate review through legislative adoption. An
integrated plan rather than piece-meal judicial interpretation could simul-
taneously answer all the questions involved. The role of the appellate
court in achieving the reviewing system's goals could be stressed through
51 Tydings, supra note 7, at 70.
52 ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1717 (1956); CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 51-194, 195,
196 (Supp. 1965); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 932.52 (Supp. 1966); HAWAn REV. LAws § 212-14
(Supp. 1965); ILL. ANN STAT. ch. 38, § 117-3(e) (1964); IOWA CoDE ANN. § 793.18 (1950);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, §2141-§2144 (Supp. 1965); MD. ANN. CODE art. 26, §§ 132-138
(1966); MAss. GEN. LAWs ANN. ch. 278, §§ 28A-28D (1959); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 29-2308
(1964); N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. §§ 543, 764; ORE. STAT. §§ 138.050, 138.090 (1963);
TENN. CODE ANN. §40-2711 (1955).
53 Bailey v. State, 381 S.W.2d 467,474 (Ark. 1964); State v. Iedbetter, 83 Idaho 451,364
P.2d 171 (1961); Hudson v. State, 399 P.2d 296 (Okla. Crim. App. 1965); Commonwealth v.
Green, 396 Pa. 137, 151 A.2d 241 (1959); State v. Johnson, 67 NJ. Super. 414, 170 A.2d 830
(1961); State v. Tuttle, 21 Wis. 2d 147, 124 N.W.2d 9 (1963).
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legislative mandate. Legislative planning and adoption would ensure that
the questions discussed in the remainder of this article would be answered.
B. Limitations on the Right of Appeal
Limitations of one kind or another upon the availability of review
have been proposed in order to quell fears of a flood of frivolous cases.
One of the more common limitations adopted is to permit review only for
sentences exceeding a certain length. 4 Although it may be a political neces-
sity to include such a limitation in a proposed statute, such an arbitrary
limitation would defeat much of the effectiveness of a reviewing system.
As one commentator has suggested, ". . merely because a sentence is rela-
tively brief does not assure that it is equitable, appropriate or not exces-
sive."m5
Another suggestion for limiting the possible number of sentence ap-
peals is to grant review only if the defendant pleaded guilty."' A limita-
tion such as this is unsound. It would not quell the fear of great numbers
of appeals because up to 90% of defendants plead guilty.5" This limita-
tion is also undesirable because it would not protect defendants against
judges and juries who, after the trial, failed to consider relevant factors
or permitted their emotions to rule.
A third possible limitation is to grant reviewing courts the power to
increase, as'well as decrease, sentences which have been appealed. Various
commentators, however, have raised substantial doubts as to whether the
power to increase sentences discourages frivolous appeals; indeed, this may
seriously limit the possibility of attaining the goals of a review system. 8
It has been theorized in a study of an appellate review system with a pro-
vision permitting increases in sentences that
[s]ince the Division has the power to increase as well as decrease sen-
tences, creating a risk for the appellant, the majority of appeals have come
from those prisoners who have the least to lose, those sentenced in the
upper range of penalties for their offense.-9
Since perhaps only these offenders with "the least to lose" will take the
chance of appeal, it seems very unlikely that the system will provide a
remedy to many deserving offenders or ample opportunity to develop any
extensive sentencing policies.6"
In view of the political and practical necessity of some limitation on
54 See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 1, at 15; Halperin, supra note 16, at 135; Connecticut
Study, supra note 15.
5' Tydings, supra note 7, at 72.
56 ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 138.050, 168.090 (1963).
57 ABA STANDARDS at 1.
5 8 Halperin, supra note 16, at 138; Connecticut Study, supra note 15, at 1464.
59 Connecticut Study, supra note 15, at 1464.
60 It is interesting to note that the English Review Courts had this power and formally aban-
doned it in 1965 with legislative abandonment coming in 1966. Tydings, supra note 7, at 72.
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sentence appeals, one of the best suggestions thus far seems to be some sort
of discretionary screening system, developed by the courts, to safeguard
against frivolous appeals. One possibility would be to establish a proce-
dure for seeking and granting leave to appeal similar to the rules adopted
in England or Massachusetts."' Another proposed criterion for granting
appellate review is the A.B.A. proposal that
[i]f a case would.., be serious enough to warrant review of a trial leading
to conviction . . . it would be serious enough to warrant review of the
sanction imposed 2
C. The Proper Court for Sentence Review
Another controversial issue concerning the establishment of an appel-
late review procedure is over what court should have the power to review
sentences. The issue is whether or not to distinguish appeals relating to
sentences from appeals based on the merits of the conviction. The A.B.A.
Proposal and the majority of states with appellate review vest the sentence
reviewing power in the existing appellate courts."3 It is argued that
[t]he use of regular appellate courts to review sentences will thus have
the virtue of arming such courts, which must in any event bear the main
burden of review in criminal cases, with the power to resolve the whole
case before them.04
Another advantage to the single reviewing court is that it will prevent
litigation over jurisdictional questions. If two distinct courts are used much
unnecessary litigation will result in an attempt to draw the line between
the process of convicting; that is, it may be difficult to determine whether
a complaint goes to the issue of a "wrongful" conviction or of a "wrong"
sentence. It is argued that this litigation could be prevented if one court
ruled on all issues. A third argument given in favor of a single reviewing
system is that it would be much easier and quicker to impliment a sen-
tence reviewing system into the existing system than to start a whole new
system.
The advocates of a dual reviewing system argue that the alleged ad-
vantages of the single system are illusionary. The handling of all appel-
late issues by a single court may avoid the "jurisdictional" problems, but
is it desirable to avoid the other questions? In a hard case, there would be
61 MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 278, § 28B (1956). For a discussion of the working of the English
system see MEADOR REPORT, quoted in ABA STANDARDS, supra note 1, 115-117.
02 ABA STANDARDS, supra note 1, at 17.
63 Amz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-1717 (1956); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 932.52 (Supp. 1966);
HAWAII REv. LAws § 212-14 (Supp. 1965); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 117-3(e) (1964); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 793.18 (1950); NEB. REV. STAT. §29-2308 (1964); N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. §§
543, 764; ORE REv. STAT. §§ 138.050, 138.090 (1963); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-2711 (1955);
ABA STANDARDS, supra note 1, at 32, 33.
04 ABA STANDARDS, supra note 1, at 35.
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temptation to take the "easy way out" and settle the "question of the legal-
ity of the conviction with the question of the propriety of the sentence" 5
by compromise and simply lower the sentence."6 Placing both types of
issues in the hands of one court may create problems from the standpoint
of court procedure. Although it would be easy to give existing appellate
courts one more issue to handle, those courts would not have the proce-
dures and rules necessary to make further investigations or to consider
information beyond the trial court record. Such provisions could be easily
adopted but the effect of such provisions would be hard to limit solely to
the sentencing issue. It would seem to be easier to make new provisions
specifically designed for the new issue to be used by a new court than to
integrate these needed provisions into the conventional appellate rules.0 7
One of the greatest advantages of a separate reviewing court would be
that the prohibiaive procedures and expenses involved in an appeal on the
merits of the case could be effectively by-passed. A sentence reviewing
court could be operated with fewer formalities than the present appellate
courts. As briefs are generally used "to isolate and expose issues of law,""8
they would not be necessary if the appeal were before a court with the issue
squarely before it. It would even be possible for the man convicted, with
instructions from the court or prison officials, to file some papers neces-
sary to point out why his sentence should be reduced. In this way, ap-
peals can be open to all convicted defendants, not just those who can pay.
Adopting a separate court would enable the case to be heard much sooner,
since the court would not be burdened by a large backlog of cases. Upon
an examination of the advantages and disadvantages of each system one
must agree that the specialized sentence reviewing court is the better alter-
native in terms of the availability and viability of a reviewing system.
D. The Need for a Court's Articulation of Reasons for a Sentence
Above there was some mention of a requirement that reviewing courts
articulate their reasons for sentence changes. This type of provision is im-
portant because
[t]o improve sentencing decisions, the Review Division must write opin-
ions which clearly describe the relationship between the factors involved
in a specific case and the aim or aims of the criminal law that should be
emphasized in that case.609
65 Halperin, supra note 16, at 145.
66 See, e.g., People v. Cage, 32 Ill. 2d 530, 216 N.E.2d 805,807 (1965).
67 Examples of provisions difficult to integrate into the existing appellate rules are provisions
made to secure more information than exists in the record and provisions for an appearance by
the defendant. Existing Appellate Rules generally disallow these types of provisions which
should be used for the sentencing issue but not other issues. It would be difficult to limit the
influence of such provisions to only one issue.
6 8 Halperin, supra note 16, at 145.
69 Connecticut Study, supra note 15, at 1466.
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Although there is controversy over the necessity and importance of
such a requirement,o the chances of developing some sort of sentencing
criteria and policies would surely be enhanced by a statement giving the rea-
sons for a change in sentence.
Another provision which should be included in the establishment of
a sentence reviewing system is a requirement that trial court judges, as
well as appellate judges, state their reasons for imposing a certain sentence
on a particular defendant. There are, of course, problems with such a
provision. One judge states that "most judges would not like to write all
the reasons why they have imposed sentence. '7 1  Surely this is one reason
for including such a provision. A statement of reasons would be of ser-
vice to an appellate court in that it would show what factors the trial court
considered. Such a statement would also serve to present the state's posi-
tion on an appeal. This requirement could also benefit the rehabilitative
aspect of sentencing because the man convicted would know why he re-
ceived the sentence that he did.72
V. CONCLUSION
Appellate review of criminal sentences offers much hope for the future
elimination of disparity.
[E]ven as it now imperfectly operates in those jurisdictions providing it,
[the system] accomplishes ends sufficiently valuable to warrant its applica-
tion; if supplemented by [the above provisions], its merits would be sig-
nificantly magnified.73
A system of appellate review, to be completely successful, requires more
than just the provisions above. It requires the appellate courts to realize
its importance in the betterment of the existing sentencing system. The
success of the system requires these judges to view their role as more than
profectors against grossly excessive sentences. If they do adopt a wider
view, much more can be accomplished in the area of improving criminal
sentencing.
James R. Kapel
7 0 See note 34, supra.
71 Appellate Review of Senences, 32 F.R.D. 249, 284 (1962) (remarks of Judge Walsh).
72 Frankel, supra note 24, at 379.
73 1d. at 371.
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